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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 10-4329 
_____________ 
 
FRIENDS OF ANIMALS, A Connecticut Non-Profit Organization;  
COMPASSION FOR ANIMALS, RESPECT FOR THE ENVIRONMENT, 
 A Pennsylvania Non-Profit Organization, 
                                                                    Appellants 
 
v. 
 
UNITED STATES NATIONAL PARKS MIKE CALDWELL, In Official capacity  
as Superintendent of Valley Forge National Historical Park;  
UNITED STATES NATIONAL PARKS SERVICE, An Agency of the U.S.;  
KEN SALAZAR, In His Official Capacity as the Secretary of the Interior; 
JON JARVIS, In his Official Capacity as Director of the National Park Service;  
DENNIS REIDENBACH, In his Official Capacity as Regional Director for the  
Northeast Region of the National Park Service 
_____________ 
 
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA 
(D.C. Civil No. 09-cv-05349) 
District Judge:  Honorable Mitchell S. Goldberg 
____________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
June 20, 2011 
____________ 
 
Before: BARRY, AMBRO and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 27, 2011 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION 
____________ 
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BARRY, Circuit Judge 
 
 Appellants, relying on the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the 
Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), challenge the procedures used by the National 
Park Service (“NPS”) to conclude that a massive deer cull involving sharpshooters was 
the best option for preserving vegetation in Valley Forge National Historical Park 
(“Valley Forge Park”).  The District Court found no error, and we will affirm.     
I.  
Valley Forge Park is located in rapidly growing suburbs eighteen miles northwest 
of center city Philadelphia.  The park is overrun with white-tailed deer.  Between 1983 
and 2009, the deer density in the park increased from 31 to 35 deer per square mile to 241 
deer per square mile.  The deer voraciously eat vegetation within the park, and estimates 
of the appropriate deer density for maintaining natural forest regeneration range from 10 
to 40 deer per square mile. 
Following a three-year study and the proper publishing of notices, distribution of a 
draft environmental impact statement (“EIS”), and public meetings and public comment 
periods on the issue, the NPS published a final EIS on August 28, 2009, as required by 
NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4321 et seq.  The EIS identified as its objectives, in relevant part, the 
protection and restoration of native plant communities and the cultural landscape through 
the reduction of deer browsing, and the maintenance of the white-tailed deer population 
within the park in a manner that allowed for restoration of native plants.   
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The NPS focused on four alternatives for accomplishing these goals.  Alternative 
A was dubbed “No-action,” and called for a continuance of the then-in-place deer 
management and monitoring efforts.  Alternative B, “Combined Nonlethal Actions,” 
included a proposal for rotational fencing of selected forested areas, in conjunction with 
the introduction of a chemical reproductive control agent, when an effective chemical 
agent became available on the market.  Alternative C, “Combined Lethal Actions,” 
included direct reduction of the deer population through the use of sharpshooters.  
Alternative D, “Combined Lethal and Nonlethal Actions,” involved the use of 
sharpshooters to immediately reduce the deer population, plus the use of chemical 
reproductive controls to maintain the population size once an acceptable agent became 
available.  The NPS chose Alternative D.  The agency estimated that it would take four 
years to achieve its deer density goal.           
The EIS briefly summarized other options that the NPS considered and then 
rejected.  Under the heading “Reintroduction of Predators,” the EIS first discussed the 
unsuitability of introducing wolves or cougars.  It then noted that  
[m]oreover, the park is surrounded by developed areas and the proximity to 
humans is not appropriate for the reintroduction of large predators.  Coyotes 
(Canis latrans) are present in the park and bobcats (Lynx rufus) potentially 
could be supported by habitats within the park.  However, these predators 
have been shown not to exert effective control on white-tailed deer 
populations (Coffey and Johnston 1997).  Based on these reasons, the 
reintroduction of predators was dismissed as a management option.   
 
Id. at 214.     
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Appellants (the Connecticut-based non-profit Friends of Animals, and the 
Pennsylvania-based non-profit Compassion for Animals, Respect for the Environment 
(hereinafter, “FOA”)) filed a complaint on November 12, 2009, and the NPS agreed to 
stay the deer cull for the 2009-2010 winter season.  In April 2010, FOA moved to 
supplement the administrative record with three studies related to coyotes and their 
feeding and human-interaction habits, and moved for summary judgment.  The NPS 
cross-moved for summary judgment.  On October 5, 2010, the District Court denied 
FOA‟s motion to supplement the record.  On October 26, 2010, after the NPS announced 
its plan to commence the deer cull in winter 2010, FOA moved for a preliminary 
injunction.  The next day, the District Court denied FOA‟s motion for summary judgment 
and granted the NPS‟s motion, and denied FOA‟s motion for a preliminary injunction as 
moot.  This appeal followed.   
II.  
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  When reviewing an administrative 
agency‟s final decision under § 706 of the APA, “we review the district court‟s summary 
judgment decision de novo, while applying the appropriate standard of review to the 
agency‟s decision.”  Concerned Citizens Alliance, Inc. v. Slater, 176 F.3d 686, 693 (3d 
Cir. 1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  Under NEPA, “an agency 
decision „to go forward with a major federal action after the agency has prepared and 
considered an Environmental Impact Statement requires the court to determine whether 
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all necessary procedures were followed, to consider de novo all relevant questions of law, 
and to examine the facts to determine whether the decision was arbitrary, capricious, and 
an abuse of discretion.‟”  Id. at 705 (quoting Concord Twp. v. United States, 625 F.2d 
1068, 1073 (3d Cir. 1980)).  NEPA “has a specialized standard of review for 
arbitrariness:  In deciding whether the agency acted arbitrarily, we will not substitute our 
own judgment for that of the agency, but we will insist that the agency has, in fact, 
adequately studied the issue and taken a hard look at the environmental consequences of 
its decision.”  Meister v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 623 F.3d 363, 377 (6th Cir. 2010) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  We presume that the agency action is valid, and 
the burden of proof “rests with the appellants who challenge such action.”  Citizens’ 
Comm. to Save Our Canyons v. Krueger, 513 F.3d 1169, 1176 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).     
NEPA “serves procedural rather than substantive goals.  It does not require 
agencies to achieve particular substantive environmental results, but requires them to 
collect and disseminate information about the environmental consequences of proposed 
actions.”  Save Our Cumberland Mountains v. Kempthorne, 453 F.3d 334, 338 (6th Cir. 
2006) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  NEPA “requires the [agency] to 
consider only „reasonable‟ alternatives in the EIS.”  Concerned Citizens Alliance, 176 
F.3d at 705.  “[W]here the agency has examined a breadth of alternatives but has 
excluded from consideration alternatives that would not meet the goals of the project, the 
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agency has satisfied NEPA.”  Id. at 706.  We review an agency‟s “reasonableness” 
determination “with considerable deference to the agency‟s expertise and policy-making 
role.”  City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1999).   
 FOA argues that (1) the NPS failed to adequately consider the reasonable 
alternative of increasing the local coyote population; (2) the EIS contained false 
alternatives that presented the NPS with only one viable option; and (3) the District Court 
gave undue deference to the NPS without properly reviewing the administrative record.  
Additionally, FOA argues that adequate judicial oversight was impossible without 
supplementation of the record.  
A. 
i. 
FOA argues that the NPS did not follow NEPA requirements when it failed to 
consider increasing the coyote population as a reasonable alternative.  This argument 
raises the issue of how an agency determines when an option is “reasonable,” an issue we 
addressed in Concerned Citizens Alliance, 176 F.3d at 705-06.   
There, the question was whether the U.S. Department of Transportation violated 
NEPA by “failing to evaluate in detail an alternative” to building a bridge that directed 
traffic through an historic district.  Id. at 690.  The defendants considered but did not 
perform a detailed study of the plaintiffs‟ desired alternative—building a second bridge in 
an alternate location—because defendants “deemed that alternative unreasonable.”  Id. at 
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692.  In determining that the plaintiffs‟ alternative was not feasible, the defendants had 
conducted a study of local drivers, concluded that the alternative was financially 
unreasonable, determined that the alternative created new environmental problems, and 
decided that building a second bridge was unnecessary to fulfill the goals of the project.  
Id. at 703-04.  We noted that “[t]here is necessarily a limit to the thoroughness with which 
an agency can analyze every option,” and we concluded that “the defendants adequately 
considered the [second bridge] alternative and its attendant flaws before rejecting it as 
infeasible.”  Id. at 706.  We also noted that “plaintiffs have not offered a „specific, 
detailed counterproposal that had a chance of success.‟”  Id. (quoting City of Angoon v. 
Hodel, 803 F.2d 1016, 1022 (9th Cir. 1986)).     
In rejecting the option of coyote predation, the NPS seems to have relied 
principally—if not wholly—on a 1997 study stating that coyotes could not consistently 
control white-tailed deer populations.  App. at 362.  Based on that study, “the 
reintroduction of predators was dismissed as a management option.”  Id. at 214.  We must 
evaluate the NPS‟s choice of alternatives in light of the stated objectives of the action.  
“[A]n alternative is properly excluded from consideration in an environmental impact 
statement only if it would be reasonable for the agency to conclude that the alternative 
does not bring about the ends of the federal action.”  City of Alexandria, 198 F.3d at 867.   
The NPS‟s primary objective was to protect the native plants and landscape of 
Valley Forge Park, and it determined that a deer density of 241 deer per square mile had 
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“direct and indirect negative impacts on plant and animal communities.”  App. at 184.  
Accordingly, any reasonable alternative would have to result in the reduction of the deer 
population or in the prevention of such a high density of deer from accessing the 
vegetation and landscape.  The 1997 Coffey and Johnston study cited by the NPS in the 
EIS found that coyotes could not even “consistently control[]” a white-tailed deer 
population, not to mention succeed in reducing the deer population to target levels.
1
  The 
NPS clearly researched, and rejected, the idea of reducing the deer population through the 
use of predators.  It may have relied on only one study.  But with no evidence suggesting 
that an enhanced coyote population could reduce the white-tailed deer population in 
Valley Forge Park, and with evidence stating exactly the contrary, the NPS did not err in 
concluding that coyote predation was not a reasonable alternative and did not require 
further study.  Concerned Citizens Alliance, 176 F.3d at 706.
2
    
Further, although not dispositive, we noted in Concerned Citizens Alliance that the 
plaintiffs did not offer a detailed counterproposal to the agency‟s preferred option “that 
had a chance of success.”  Id.  That is also the case here.  FOA sought to add to the record 
certain studies relating to coyote predation and coyote-human interactions.  The District 
                                                 
1
  The record contains portions of two other studies, not cited in the EIS, supporting 
the conclusions of the Coffey and Johnston study, although it is unclear whether the NPS 
relied on those studies.  See id. at 366; id. at 372. 
2
  FOA argues that the NPS never actually considered the option of enhancing the 
coyote population because the EIS subchapter discussing coyotes was titled 
“Reintroduction of Predators,” and coyotes already existed in Valley Forge Park.  Even 
assuming that FOA is correct, our analysis is unchanged because the available evidence 
suggested that coyotes cannot reduce the deer population.      
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Court did not consider them, but we have, and it is clear that two of the studies support 
the NPS‟s conclusion that coyotes could not reduce the white-tailed deer population in 
Valley Forge Park.  See App. at 37; id. at 126.   
The Federal Regulations governing the NPS‟s actions required the agency to 
“[r]igorously explore . . . all reasonable alternatives” and only “briefly discuss the 
reasons” for eliminating other options from detailed study.  40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(a).  The 
NPS adequately considered and appropriately rejected the option of coyote predation 
because there was not a shred of evidence that such an option could achieve the NPS‟s 
stated goals.  The NPS‟s determination on this issue was neither arbitrary nor capricious.    
ii. 
FOA contends that alternatives A and B were no more than “straw men,” and that 
the NPS from the beginning preferred to “shoot the deer,” Appellants‟ Br. at 18, the 
options available in alternatives C and D.  NEPA requires federal agencies to study in 
detail all reasonable alternatives to actions significantly affecting the quality of the human 
environment.  42 U.S.C. §§ 4332(2)(C)(iii), (E); 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.1, 1502.14(a).  Other 
circuits “have interpreted this requirement to preclude agencies from defining the 
objectives of their actions in terms so unreasonably narrow they can be accomplished by 
only one alternative.”  Colo. Envtl. Coal. v. Dombeck, 185 F.3d 1162, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 
1999) (citing cases from the Seventh and D.C. circuits).  However, NEPA does not 
mandate particular results, and courts “only consider whether an agency‟s decisions 
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regarding which alternatives to discuss and how extensively to discuss them were 
arbitrary, keeping in mind that such decisions are necessarily bound by a rule of reason 
and practicality.”  Greater Yellowstone Coal. v. Flowers, 359 F.3d 1257, 1277 (10th Cir. 
2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).  The goal of court review “is to 
ensure that the agency gathered information sufficient to permit a reasoned choice of 
alternatives as far as environmental aspects are concerned.”  Id. (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted).    
The record indicates that the NPS engaged in a lengthy and reasoned review 
process before focusing on alternatives A, B, C, and D and ultimately choosing 
Alternative D.  As an initial matter, FOA‟s arguments regarding Alternative A as being 
only a false alternative fall flat; federal regulations required the NPS to include 
Alternative A, the “No-action” alternative, in the EIS.  40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(d).  As to 
Alternative B, “Combined Nonlethal Actions,” the NPS met internally to discuss 
management of the white-tailed deer population beginning in September 2006.  The 
results of those meetings were discussed in a Final Internal Scoping Report, which shows 
that NPS considered the nonlethal options of chemical reproductive control, fencing of 
targeted areas or the entire park, the “hazing” or frightening of the deer, translocation, the 
use of chemical repellents, and supplemental feeding to reduce damage to the natural 
vegetation.  Id. at 267-71.  The NPS also formed two scientific teams to review and 
discuss deer management options and conditions at the park.  Id. at 175.  It held several 
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public meetings on its deer management plan and received thousands of comments, and 
released the final EIS after a three-year process of internal review and public comment.  
Even if alternatives C and D were more viable options than Alternative B by the time the 
NPS prepared the final EIS, the record reflects that the NPS seriously considered options 
other than using sharpshooters to kill the deer.  The NPS included a reasonable range of 
alternatives and did not violate the requirements of NEPA.               
iii. 
FOA contends that the District Court failed to conduct a “probing review” of the 
record to determine whether the NPS followed NEPA‟s procedural requirements.  FOA 
relies principally on Olenhouse v. Commodity Credit Corp., a non-NEPA case from the 
Tenth Circuit.  42 F.3d 1560, 1565-66 (10th Cir. 1994).  There, instead of reviewing the 
administrative record itself, the district court concluded that the record supported the 
agency‟s action based on “counsel‟s statements as to what was in the record and material 
appended to the government‟s „Motion to Affirm‟” and “isolated bits of this second hand 
„evidence.‟”  Id. at 1565.  The court also supplied reasons for the agency‟s decision which 
were not contained in the record and which the agency asserted for the first time in the 
district court.  Id. at 1576.  The Tenth Circuit determined that the court‟s reliance on 
evidence outside the administrative record was error, and it reviewed the record itself and 
reversed.  Id. at 1579-80, 1584.   
Even if the District Court‟s analysis in this case focused on its conclusion that 
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increasing the number of coyotes in an urban park environment was against “common 
sense,” App. at 17, rather than focusing on the EIS‟s stated reasons for rejecting coyote 
predation, its approach is far different from the district court‟s in Olenhouse.  Here, it is 
clear that the District Court reviewed the record, albeit substituting its own “common 
sense” interpretation of the NPS‟s decision (or, at a minimum, accepting a “common 
sense” argument by the NPS that was not part of the administrative record).  That “error,” 
if it is such, does not require remand, as our review permits us to conclude that the NPS 
complied with NEPA in determining that coyote predation was an unreasonable 
alternative.  Nicini v. Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 805 (3d Cir. 2000) (en banc) (“We may affirm 
the District Court on any grounds supported by the record.”); see also Olenhouse, 42 F.3d 
at 1580 (declining to vacate and remand district court order and choosing to review the 
record and rule on the merits at the circuit level).   
B. 
FOA argues that the District Court should have granted its motion to supplement 
the record with three studies addressing coyote hunting habits and tendencies in human 
interactions.  We will review a district court‟s decision to reject or admit evidence outside 
of the administrative record for abuse of discretion.  See Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Hoffman, 
132 F.3d 7, 16 (2d Cir. 1997).   
The APA requires a court reviewing an agency action to “review the whole record 
or those parts of it cited by a party.”  5 U.S.C. § 706.  The Supreme Court has held that 
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“the focal point for judicial review should be the administrative record already in 
existence, not some new record made initially in the reviewing court.”  Camp v. Pitts, 411 
U.S. 138, 142 (1973).  FOA argues that certain circuits have adopted a more permissive 
approach to allowing extra-record review in NEPA cases.  See Lee v. U.S. Air Force, 354 
F.3d 1229, 1242 (10th Cir. 2004); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, 132 F.3d at 14-15; Esch v. 
Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989).  We have not addressed whether a specific 
NEPA exception applies, and we will not do so here.  FOA‟s proposed extra-record 
evidence either (a) does not conflict with the NPS‟s findings; or (b) is irrelevant because 
the EIS focuses on the failure of coyotes to control the deer population, not on the issues 
surrounding human-coyote interactions.  Because the record discloses the factors 
considered by the NPS in rejecting coyote predation, and because FOA‟s proposed record 
additions do not conflict with those factors, there is no reason to supplement the 
administrative record.  
III.  
We will affirm.     
 
  
 
